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ABSTRACT
Gruber (1996) drew attention to the puzzle that investors buy actively managed equity mutual
funds, even though on average, such funds underperform index funds. We uncover another
puzzling fact about the market for equity mutual funds: funds with worse before-fee performance
charge higher fees. This negative relation between fees and performance is robust and can be
explained as the outcome of strategic fee-setting by mutual funds in the presence of investors
with different degrees of sensitivity to performance. We also find some evidence that better fund
governance may bring fees more in line with performance.
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Many studies have attempted to determine whether equity mutual funds are able to consistently
earn positive risk-adjusted returns.1 Although these studies have documented significant differences
in risk-adjusted returns across funds, it became apparent early on (Sharpe (1966)) that those
differences are to a large extent attributable to differences in fund fees. Most research on mutual
funds has thus been aimed at determining whether the cross-sectional variation in performance
that is not explained by fees can be explained by the existence of managers with superior stock-
picking skills (see, e.g., Chevalier and Ellison (1999)). However, little attention has been paid to
the relation between before-fee performance and fees. In this paper we focus on this relation and
investigate whether differences in fees reflect differences in the value that mutual funds create for
investors.
Mutual fund fees pay for the services provided to investors by the fund. Since the main service
provided by a mutual fund is portfolio management, fees should reflect funds’ risk-adjusted perfor-
mance. It follows that there should be a positive relation between before-fee risk-adjusted expected
returns and fees. In contrast to this prediction, we find a puzzling negative relation between before-
fee risk-adjusted performance and fees in a sample of U.S. equity mutual funds: funds with worse
before-fee risk-adjusted performance charge higher fees. To check the robustness of this finding,
we use different estimation methods and performance measures, and we investigate the relation for
different subsamples. The negative relation between before-fee risk-adjusted performance and fees
survives these robustness checks.
We then set out to explain this anomalous relation by investigating the role of performance in
the determination of fund fees. Christoffersen and Musto (2002) propose that mutual funds’ fees are
set taking into account the elasticity of the demand for their shares, so that funds facing less elastic
demand charge higher fees. These authors argue that funds with worse past performance face less
elastic demand, since performance-sensitive investors leave funds following bad performance. If
performance is persistent for at least the worse-performing funds (as indicated by Carhart (1997)),
Christoffersen and Musto’s hypothesis could explain our finding of a negative relation between
fees and before-fee performance. Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdu´ (2008) provide a related explanation.
These authors set forth a model of the market for mutual funds in which competition among
high-performance funds for the money of sophisticated (performance-sensitive) investors pushes
their fees down and drives the low-performance funds out of that segment of the market. Low-
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performance funds then target unsophisticated investors, to whom they are able to charge higher
fees. We also consider the possibility that funds with low expected performance have higher fees
because they incur higher marketing costs, which they pass on to investors. Underperforming funds
will have high distribution costs or advertising outlays if they target unsophisticated investors, and
these investors are more responsive to advertising or more likely to use brokers to purchase mutual
funds. We test these strategic fee-setting hypotheses against an alternative cost-based explanation,
according to which the negative relation between performance and fees that results from univariate
regressions would simply be due to the omission of fund characteristics associated with both lower
operating costs and better performance.
To test these hypotheses, we estimate the relation between fund fees and performance, investors’
sensitivity to fund performance, which we measure by the estimated slope of the relation between
performance and money flows, and a number of variables that have been previously identified as
determinants of funds’ operating costs. Our results are consistent with the strategic explanations
described above: even after controling for a host of fund characteristics, underperforming funds and
funds faced with less performance-sensitive investors charge higher marketing and non-marketing
fees.
The apparent inability of mutual fund competition to ensure an adequate relation between
risk-adjusted performance and fees raises the question of whether improvements in mutual fund
governance can bring fees more into line with the value that funds generate for investors. To
evaluate the potential effects of recent regulatory reforms that impose stricter requirements on
mutual fund governance, we analyze the role played by fund governance in fee determination. We
find some evidence that funds with boards of directors expected, a priori, to provide more effective
protection of investors’ interests charge fees that better reflect their risk-adjusted performance.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section I we describe the mutual fund fee structure and the
data set. In Section II we explain how we estimate fund performance. In Section III we estimate
the relation between before-fee performance and fees and perform several tests to evaluate the
robustness of the results. In Section IV we discuss and test several explanations for the estimated
relation between fees and performance. Section V concludes.
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I. Data
A. Mutual Fund Fee Structure
Fund management fees are typically computed as a fixed percentage of the value of assets under
management.2 These fees, together with other operating costs—such as custodian, administration,
accounting, registration, and transfer agent fees—comprise the fund’s expenses, which are deducted
on a daily basis from the fund’s net assets by the managing company. Expenses are usually expressed
as a percentage of assets under management known as the “expense ratio.” Fees paid to brokers in
the course of the fund’s trading activity are detracted from the fund’s assets, but are not included
in the expense ratio.
Funds often charge “loads,” which are one-time fees that are used to pay distributors. These
loads are paid at the time of purchasing (“front-end load”) or redeeming (“back-end load” or
“deferred sales charge”) fund shares and are computed as a fraction of the amount invested.3
Since 1980, funds may charge so-called “12b-1 fees,” which are included in the expense ratio
and, like loads, are used to pay for marketing and distribution costs. Since the 1990s, many funds
offer multiple share classes with different combinations of loads and 12b-1 fees. Among the most
common classes are class A shares, which are characterized by high front-end loads and low annual
12b-1 fees, and class B and C shares, which typically have no or low front-end loads but have higher
12b-1 fees and a contingent deferred sales load. This contingent deferred sales load decreases the
longer the shares are held and is eventually eliminated (typically after one year for class C shares,
and after six to seven years for class B shares).
B. Sample Description
We obtain our data from the CRSP Survivor-Bias Free U.S. Mutual Fund Database for the
period from December 1961 to December 2005 (see Carhart (1997), Carhart et al. (2002), and
Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2001) for detailed discussions of the data set). The initial sample
contains all open-end mutual funds that are active in the 1961 to 2005 period. From this initial
sample, we exclude all funds that we cannot confidently describe as diversified domestic equity
mutual funds. Thus, we remove money market, bond and income, and specialty mutual funds,
such as sector or international funds. To obtain our sample of diversified domestic equity mutual
3
funds, we use the information on funds’ investment objectives available in the CRSP database.
Unfortunately, this information is not consistent throughout the 1961 to 2005 period. To create a
homogeneous sample for the full sample period, we combine all the information available on funds’
investment objectives. Some of our results, however, are derived only for the 1992 to 2005 period,
for which the information on funds’ investment objectives is precise and consistent.
We remove from the sample observations with no information on returns or expenses, or with
zero expenses. The remaining sample contains some observations with extreme values for expenses
or returns that are either data errors, or that correspond to small funds with unusually high expenses
or very high volatility. Given the large size of the data set, we use Hadi’s (1994) outlier detection
method to search for these outliers and remove them from the sample.
Finally, to ensure that our results are not driven by differences between index and actively
managed funds or between institutional and retail funds, we identify passively managed (index)
and institutional funds and exclude them from the sample. In the Supplements and Datasets section
on the Journal of Finance website,4 we provide a more detailed account of the procedure we use
to construct our final sample, as well as summary statistics of the main variables.
C. Fund Governance Data
We use the January 2007 Morningstar Principia CD to obtain data on mutual funds’ board
quality. This data set includes several governance ratings as of December 2006, which Morningstar
uses to compute the so-called “Stewardship Grade” for mutual funds. The measure of board
quality that we use in our analysis (Morningstar’s “board quality” grade) is the sum of four equally
weighted components that measure, respectively, the degree to which the board has taken action “in
cases where the fund clearly hasn’t served investors well;” the significance of independent directors’
investments in the fund; whether the board is “overseeing so many funds that it may compromise
the ability to diligently protect the interests of shareholders;” and whether the fund meets the
SEC requirement for the proportion of independent directors, regardless of whether it is subject to
the requirement (see Morningstar (2006), pages 1-2, for a detailed description). Thus, the board
quality grade is closely related to board characteristics that have been the focus of both regulatory
reform and academic research.5
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Of the 3,677 actively managed, diversified, non-institutional funds (fund classes) that are active
in 2005 in our sample, there is board quality information in Morningstar’s January 2007 Principia
CD for only 1,106 funds (the governance subsample). Although only one-third of the funds in the
sample belong to the governance subsample, these funds manage almost 80% of the total net assets
managed by all funds in the sample. We note that the governance subsample is not a random
sample from the whole population. Among other differences, funds in the governance subsample
perform significantly better on average, belong to larger management companies, and are cheaper,
larger, and older than those in the non-governance subsample.
Table I reports the distribution of board quality grades. There are five grades to which Morn-
ingstar assigns a numerical score that ranges from zero to two: Very Poor (0), Poor (0.5), Fair (1),
Good (1.5), and Excellent (2). As Table I shows, most funds have Fair or Good grades, and only
one obtains a Very Poor grade. The resulting average grade lies between Fair and Good. Table I ap-
proximately
here.
II. Mutual Fund Performance Estimation
We use Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model to estimate before-fee risk-adjusted performance:
rit = αi + βrm,irmt + βsmb,ismbt + βhml,ihmlt + βpr1y,ipr1yt + εit, (1)
where rit is fund i’s before-expense return in month t in excess of the 30-day risk-free interest rate—
proxied by Ibbotson’s one-month Treasury bill rate;6 rmt is the market portfolio return in excess
of the risk-free rate; and smbt and hmlt denote the return on portfolios that proxy for common
risk factors associated with size and book-to-market, respectively. The term pr1yt is the return
difference between stocks with high and low returns in the previous year. We include this term
to account for passive momentum strategies by mutual funds.7 The term αi is the fund’s alpha
and captures the fund’s before-fee risk-adjusted performance. We also consider Fama and French’s
(1993) three-factor model, which uses only rmt, smbt, and hmlt, as well as conditional versions of
the four-factor model.
As in Carhart (1997), we follow a two-stage estimation procedure to obtain a panel of monthly
fund risk-adjusted performance estimates. In the first stage, for every month t in years 1967 to
2005, we regress funds’ before-fee excess returns on the risk factors over the previous five years. If
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less than five years of previous data are available for a specific fund-month, we require the fund to
be in the sample for at least 48 months in the previous five years, and then run the regression with
the available data. In the second stage, we estimate a fund’s risk-adjusted performance in month
t as the difference between the fund’s before-expense excess return and the realized risk premium,
defined as the vector of betas times the vector of factor realizations in month t.8
Rolling regressions yield a total of 232,386 monthly risk-adjusted before-fee returns correspond-
ing to 3,109 different actively managed retail funds over 468 months. Although the average an-
nualized monthly return before expenses in our sample equals 10.52%, subtracting the risk-free
rate and the part of fund returns explained by the portfolio’s exposure to the Fama-French three
factors yields an average annualized monthly alpha of −21 basis points (bp), which is further re-
duced to −70.6 bp when we take momentum into account. The corresponding annualized standard
deviations are 18.13%, 7.33%, and 7.15%, respectively.
III. The Relation between Fees and Performance
In a well-functioning mutual fund market, mutual fund fees should be positively correlated
with expected before-fee risk-adjusted returns. Further, in the absence of market frictions, all
funds should earn zero expected after-fee risk-adjusted returns in equilibrium since, otherwise,
there would be excess demand (supply) for funds with positive (negative) expected after-fee risk-
adjusted returns (Berk and Green (2004)). In this context, if investors know funds’ alphas, then
equilibrium requires that αi − fi = 0 for every fund i, where fi denotes fund i’s fees, expressed as
a fraction of the fund’s assets. This equilibrium condition can be equivalently written as αi = fi,
for every fund i. Therefore, a graph depicting the equilibrium relation between fees and before-fee
performance should yield an increasing linear relation with a slope of one. If, on the other hand,
investors do not know funds’ alphas, then αi in the equilibrium condition is replaced by investors’
expectation of fund i’s risk-adjusted returns.
Equilibrium in the mutual fund market can be achieved through fee adjustment if funds with
higher expected before-fee risk-adjusted returns increase their fees or underperforming funds lower
theirs. However, Berk and Green (2004) show that in the market for mutual funds, market clearing
can also be achieved via quantity adjustment: if there are decreasing returns to scale in fund
6
management, then flows of money into funds that are expected to perform better will reduce those
funds’ expected performance until expected after-fee risk-adjusted returns are equalized across all
funds in equilibrium. Whether market clearing takes place via fees, quantities, or a combination
of both is, however, not material for the definition of market equilibrium. In any case, equilibrium
requires that expected after-fee risk-adjusted returns be zero for all funds, and thus implies the
linear relation (with a slope of one) between fees and before-fee performance described above.
To investigate the relation between fund fees and before-fee risk-adjusted performance, we first
estimate by pooled OLS the regression equation
αˆit = δ0t + δ1fit + ξit, i = 1, . . . , N, t = 1, . . . , T, (2)
where fit is the fund’s expense ratio and αˆit is its risk-adjusted before-fee performance measured
according to Carhart’s (1997) model.
The first row of Table II reports the slope coefficient and White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-
robust standard error estimated using the whole sample of diversified actively managed retail equity
funds. The regression includes month dummies to ensure that the estimated slope coefficient cap-
tures the cross-sectional relation between fees and risk-adjusted returns, not the effect of potentially
correlated trends in those variables. The estimated slope coefficient is −0.63 and we can reject the
null hypothesis of a unit slope at any conventional significance level. Thus, estimation of equation
(2) yields results that are in stark contrast with the implications of a frictionless competitive market
for equity mutual funds. Table II ap-
proximately
here.
In a market with frictions, it is not clear whether a priori we should expect δ1 to be greater
or smaller than one. In one plausible scenario, better funds charge higher fees, but those fees are
not high enough to fully compensate for the differences in before-fee performance. In this scenario,
funds with higher fees offer a higher after-fee performance and the estimated δ1 is greater than one
(δ1 > 1 implies that increases in fees are matched by larger increases in before-fee performance).
In another plausible scenario, better funds overcharge for their ability to generate returns, which
leads to differences in fees that exceed differences in performance and to an estimated δ1 ∈ (0, 1). In
this context, funds with higher fees should exhibit better before-fee performance but worse after-fee
performance. Finally, fees could be completely unrelated to funds’ before-fee performance, leading
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to δ1 = 0. However, the estimated slope coefficient is negative and significantly different from
zero, which suggests an a priori much less plausible scenario in which funds with worse before-fee
performance charge higher fees.
To account for cross-sectional correlation of residuals, we follow Petersen (2009) and Thomp-
son (2006) and compute robust standard errors clustered by month. The second row of Table
II shows that the robust standard error clustered by month (0.25) is more than twice as large
as the White standard error (0.11), which suggests the presence of cross-sectional correlation in
residuals (Petersen (2009)). However, further clustering by both fund and month (to also account
for serially correlated residuals) barely changes the standard error (0.27). Therefore, unless oth-
erwise noted, throughout the rest of this section we report robust standard errors clustered by
time in all pooled OLS regressions. We also estimate the relation between fees and performance
using the Fama-MacBeth two-step approach (Fama and MacBeth (1973)), which is designed to
correct for cross-sectional correlation of residuals: first, we estimate monthly regressions, and then
we use the resulting monthly slope estimates to compute the average slope for the whole sample
and its standard error. The third row in Table II shows that the Fama-MacBeth method yields
a coefficient of −1.4 and a standard error of 0.34. (Weighting the monthly slope coefficients by
the number of observations in each month yields a coefficient of −0.76 with a standard error of
0.23.) Therefore, when we take into account the possibility of correlated residuals in our estimation
of standard errors, we also reject, at any conventional significance level, the hypothesis that the
slope of the fee-performance relation is one. Moreover, our estimate of the slope coefficient is neg-
ative and significantly different from zero at the 5% (1%) significance level when we use clustered
(Fama-MacBeth) standard errors to perform our tests.
A potential problem with our results is that estimated alphas contain funds’ true abnormal per-
formance, but they also contain estimation error from two sources, the residuals of the performance
attribution model (1) and estimation error in the realized risk premium. Estimation error in the
dependent variable in (2) may affect inference in several ways. First, this estimation error increases
the variance of the residuals and thus the standard errors of parameter estimates. Therefore, esti-
mation error in alphas decreases the likelihood of finding a significant relationship between alphas
and expense ratios. Second, if extreme alphas are more likely to include a large estimation error
and have a large influence on the estimated coefficient, then estimation error in alphas may affect
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the estimated slope coefficient. More generally, even in the absence of estimation error in alphas,
our results could be driven by a relatively small number of funds with extreme alphas or expenses.
To explore the monotonicity and linearity of the fee-performance relation, Figure 1 shows con-
ditional expected risk-adjusted performance as a nonparametric function of expenses. We estimate
the conditional expectation by using the Nadaraya-Watson estimator with a Gaussian kernel (see,
for example, Ha¨rdle (1990)). We also plot conditional expected alphas as a linear function of ex-
penses as implied by the estimated OLS coefficient of the linear regression. To account for time
effects, we de-mean expenses and risk-adjusted performance by subtracting the month’s average.
For values of expenses below the sample’s 99th percentile, Figure 1 shows that before-expense risk-
adjusted performance decreases monotonically with expenses and that the relation may be well
described by a linear function. However, for funds with expenses in the top sample percentile,
the relation appears far from monotonic, although the large confidence intervals in this low den-
sity region suggest that inference on the mean risk-adjusted performance of very expensive funds is
problematic. Therefore, Figure 1 shows that the presence of some funds with both extreme expense
ratios and extreme risk-adjusted performance does not seem to affect the OLS slope coefficient. Figure 1 ap-
proximately
here.
Finally, although all funds are affected by estimation error in betas, the standard errors of
estimated betas may vary across funds in systematic ways. Thus, although White (1980) and
clustered standard errors already account for heteroskedasticity, we also run several generalized
least squares regressions, obtaining results (see the Internet Appendix) that are essentially identical
to those obtained by OLS.
To further account for potential estimation error in alphas stemming from the estimation of
betas, we also report results obtained using other performance evaluation models. The last row of
Table II shows the results that we obtain when we estimate alpha using the Fama-French three-
factor model. The estimated coefficient is −0.2 with a standard error of 0.26. Therefore, we can
reject the null hypothesis that the slope of the fee-performance relation is one at the 1% significance
level. However, the estimated coefficient is not significantly different from zero, in contrast to the
results obtained with Carhart’s four-factor alpha. This finding suggests that on average, more
expensive funds exhibit greater exposure to the momentum factor. Further, in addition to the
three- and four-factor unconditional models, we use several conditional versions of Carhart’s four-
factor model (see, for example, Ferson and Schadt (1996) and Kosowski et al. (2006)) and obtain
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results consistent with those from the unconditional model. In the Internet Appendix, we describe
in detail the specification and results of the conditional models.
Another possible concern about our results is that they may be due to the influence of funds
with small market share. Such funds may exhibit both low performance and high expense ratios.
However, our requirement that funds have at least 48 months of return information to be included
in the sample already filters out the effect of unsuccessful funds that are terminated before reaching
that threshold. To evaluate the influence of small funds that have survived for at least five years,
we reestimate equation (2) for different samples that exclude observations with relatively low values
of assets under management in each month. Panel A of Table III shows that the negative relation
between expense ratios and before-expense risk-adjusted performance holds when the lowest size
decile is excluded each month. Although the estimated coefficient is significantly different from
one at the 1% significance level, it is smaller in absolute value than our estimate for the whole
sample and only marginally significantly different from zero. Excluding further deciles leads to
similar coefficients and standard errors (with coefficients that are either not statistically significant
or only marginally so). Thus, fund size appears to play a role in explaining the relation between
risk-adjusted performance and fund expenses. Table III ap-
proximately
here.
In the analysis above, we consider expense ratios as the only explicit cost of delegated portfolio
management. However, investors often pay loads at the time of purchasing and/or redeeming
mutual fund shares. Hence, the previous regressions could be capturing a negative relation between
performance and a specific component of total fund share ownership cost, but not necessarily a
negative relation between performance and the total fees paid by investors. In particular, if more
expensive funds (when only expenses are considered) charged lower loads, then after-fee performance
(when all fees are considered) could still be equalized across funds.
One way to circumvent this problem is to focus exclusively on funds for which annual operating
expenses account for 100% of all fees. In Table III (Panel B), we estimate equation (2) for no-load
funds only. The estimated slope coefficient of −0.91, which is significant at the 1% level, indicates
that total ownership cost and performance are negatively correlated for no-load funds.
Since load funds constitute two-thirds of the sample, we also estimate the relation between
performance and a measure of total fund ownership cost for these funds. Following Sirri and
Tufano (1998), we compute total annual ownership costs by adding annuitized total loads (total
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loads divided by the number of years, τ , that investors keep their money in the fund) to annual
expense ratios. Although previous studies typically set τ = 7, redemption rates for equity funds
for more recent periods suggest a shorter average holding period in the range of 2.5 to 5 years.
Therefore, we perform the analysis for τ = 2 and 7 years. Since the analysis in Table III is conducted
at a monthly frequency, the independent variable is total monthly ownership cost, defined as total
annual ownership cost divided by 12. Panel B of Table III shows that total ownership cost is
negatively and significantly associated with before-fee risk-adjusted performance for both holding
periods. Further, the unit slope hypothesis is rejected at any conventional significance level.
As a final test of the robustness of our regression results, we estimate equation (2) for different
subperiods and mutual fund categories. Panel C of Table III shows that the perfectly competitive
equilibrium condition is clearly violated in all subperiods considered. Moreover, the relation be-
tween before-fee risk-adjusted performance and expenses is negative in all the subperiods, although
not significantly different from zero in the 1967 to 1976 and 1997 to 2005 subperiods. Lack of sig-
nificance in the 1967 to 1976 subperiod could be due to the relatively low number of observations,
which results in a large standard error for the slope coefficient. However, failure to reject the null
hypothesis of a zero coefficient in the last subperiod appears to happen because the fee-performance
relation becomes flatter in the last years of our sample: although the estimated slope coefficient
lies between −0.81 and −0.99 in the pre-1997 years, it is −0.54 in the last subperiod considered.
Finally, for the 1992 to 2005 period, for which the classification is detailed and consistent, we
divide the sample into subsamples according to the Standard & Poor’s detailed objective code as
reported by CRSP, and then run the regression for each subsample. Panel D of Table III shows that
expense ratios are negatively related to performance for all five investment objectives, although the
relation is not statistically significant for Aggressive Growth and Growth MidCap funds. For these
investment objectives, the unit slope hypothesis can be rejected, but only at the 10% significance
level. When we replace expense ratios with total ownership cost with τ = 2 or 7 years, we obtain
results that are similar to those of Panel D (see the Internet Appendix for results).
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IV. Explaining the Relation between Fees and Performance
The negative relation between before-fee performance and fees that we uncover in the previous
section is at odds with the intuitive expectation that fees should, at least to some extent, reflect
the value that funds create for investors. In this section we set forth and test different explanations
for this apparently anomalous relation.
A. Cost-based Explanations
According to the first explanation, fees simply reflect the costs of operating the fund. If low
costs are associated with better before-fee risk-adjusted performance, then a univariate regression
would result in a negative relation between fees and performance.
Fund performance could be positively associated with fund costs if higher costs reflect higher
salaries to attract more talented managers or a larger investment in research tools, but there are
also arguments for a negative correlation between costs and performance. For instance, there might
be economies of scale that lower operating costs for larger funds. In addition, larger size may be
associated with better performance if a fund’s size reflects its past performance, and performance
is persistent. Similarly, older funds might benefit from learning economies, which could be passed
on to investors in the form of lower fees. If fund longevity is related to good performance, as would
be the case if low-performance funds were more likely to close down, we could observe a negative
relation between costs and performance. Finally, higher managerial skill may be associated with
both better investment decisions and more efficient management of fund operations, which would
translate into lower operating costs.
B. Strategic Explanations
The second explanation views the negative relation between before-fee performance and fees as
the result of strategic fee setting by mutual fund management companies or other service providers
to the fund. One such explanation has been proposed and empirically tested for money market
mutual funds by Christoffersen and Musto (2002). On the basis of empirical studies on mutual fund
flows (e.g., Sirri and Tufano (1998)) and survey data on mutual fund investors’ behavior (Capon,
Fitzimmons, and Prince (1996), Alexander, Jones, and Nigro (1997)), Christoffersen and Musto
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argue that mutual fund investors differ in their performance sensitivity. They also argue that
funds with a worse performance history will have a less performance-sensitive clientele, since the
performance-sensitive investors will have fled those funds following bad performance. Therefore,
funds with a greater proportion of performance-insensitive investors will charge higher fees, since
for these funds the reduction in after-fee performance caused by an increase in fees will not translate
into a large flow of money out of the fund. It follows that funds with bad past performance will
find it optimal to charge higher fees. Christoffersen and Musto’s explanation can be tested by using
a measure of the performance sensitivity of each fund’s flows.
Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdu´ (2008) provide a related strategic explanation for the negative relation
between before-fee performance and fees. These authors develop an asymmetric information model
of the mutual fund market in which mutual funds differ in their expected performance and investors
differ in their performance sensitivity. Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdu´ show that competition for the
money of performance-sensitive investors leads to an equilibrium in which funds that expect to
earn higher returns (“good” funds) reduce their fees up to the point at which they effectively
price funds that expect lower returns (“bad” funds) out of the performance-sensitive segment of
the market. Good funds are able to price bad funds out of the market because the revenues of
management companies are determined as a fraction of assets under management. Therefore, for
any given fee (expressed as a fraction of asset value), good funds, which can be expected to achieve
a larger increase in the value of their assets, will earn higher expected revenues. As a result, there
is a fee level at which good funds break even in expectation, and low-performance funds incur an
expected loss. Unable to compete for performance-sensitive investors, bad funds raise their fees to
extract rents from performance-insensitive investors. Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdu´’s predictions can
also be tested by using a measure of a fund’s risk-adjusted expected performance.
A related explanation for our results is that low-performance funds incur higher marketing
costs and those costs are passed on to investors in the form of higher fees. If low-performance
funds target performance-insensitive investors and these investors purchase mutual fund shares
mostly through brokers, then low-performance funds will incur higher marketing costs than funds
sold through more direct distribution channels (e.g., from mutual fund supermarkets or directly
from the management company). Bergstresser, Chalmers, and Tufano (2007) provide evidence that
supports this hypothesis. These authors report that on average funds sold through the direct or
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fund supermarket channels perform better and have lower fees than those sold through the broker
channel. The marketing costs of low-performance funds could also be higher if intermediaries have
to be compensated for the higher effort or potential loss of reputation associated with selling low-
performance funds.9 Alternatively, if unsophisticated investors are more responsive to advertising
and low-performance funds target those investors, then low-performance funds will spend more
on advertising, since the marginal return of their advertising investment will be higher. These
strategic marketing explanations imply that underperforming funds will have higher marketing
fees, an implication that we can test with our data.
Both Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdu´’s (2008) explanation and the strategic marketing hypothesis
assume that fund management companies form expectations about the future performance of the
funds they manage, and that they condition their funds’ fees on those expectations. This as-
sumption seems reasonable since management companies are able to observe all publicly available
information about funds’ portfolio choices and returns, they have access to a wealth of data not
available to outsiders (such as high-frequency data on portfolio holdings), and they have the skills
to analyze all that information. Further, management companies themselves may strongly influence
the performance of their funds, since they decide how to allocate scarce resources (staff, research
analysis, underpriced IPOs) among them (Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2006), Guedj and Papas-
taikoudi (2005)). However, a limitation of these hypotheses is that they do not explain why, rather
than adjusting fees, management companies do not try to improve the expected performance of
their funds by replacing underperforming managers or changing their investment strategies. In
particular, funds with low expected performance could be turned into closet indexers, guaranteeing
a level of performance close to the benchmark. Addressing these limitations is beyond the scope
of this paper, but allowing for managers’ replacement or changes in investment strategies may not
substantially change the predictions of the strategic explanations. First, not all companies will be
able to hire only the managers with the highest expected performance, and mutual funds with less-
than-top managers may be able to survive, at least in the medium run, especially in the presence
of unsophisticated investors. Second, even if closet indexing guarantees that returns do not fall too
much below a fund’s benchmark, closet indexers will still underperform funds that have managers
who are able to generate positive alphas. Further, a strategy of closet indexing also entails some
less-obvious costs. In particular, sophisticated investors will leave a fund that they identify as a
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closet indexer, because closet indexers are dominated in terms of after-fee returns by index funds.
Another potential limitation of the strategic explanations is that although many studies docu-
ment the existence of a significant pool of unsophisticated investors, it is an open question whether
unsophistication can persist in the medium or long run. In particular, cheaper or better-performing
funds may want to educate performance-insensitive investors to avoid expensive funds. However,
Gabaix and Laibson (2006) show that firms may not have incentives to educate investors to avoid
“shrouded” costly attributes (product attributes that are hidden by firms, even though they could
be almost costlessly revealed). Even though most of Gabaix and Laibson’s analysis focuses on
add-ons (product attributes that the consumer can substitute away at a cost), they also discuss
factors that might limit firms’ incentives to educate unsophisticated investors about unavoidable
shrouded costs.
C. Fund Governance
The strategic explanations discussed above implicitly assume that mutual fund fees are set by
management companies so as to maximize fee revenues. However, U.S. mutual funds are legal
entities that are independent of the companies managing their portfolio. Control over the fund
is delegated by fund shareholders to a board of directors (or trustees), which is responsible for
contracting the management of the fund’s portfolio with a management company. Thus, the man-
agement fee is not set unilaterally by the management company; rather, it is negotiated with the
board of directors. Similarly, the fund’s directors negotiate the fees paid to other service providers,
such as distributors or transfer agents. Boards of directors have the fiduciary duty to ensure that
those fees reflect the value for fund investors of the services they are paying for.
Despite legal provisions imposing rigorous governance requirements on mutual funds, there
remain important conflicts of interest that may interfere with fund directors’ fiduciary duty. For
instance, management companies select the members of a fund’s initial board of directors. In
practice, contract renegotiations and changes in the fund’s management company are infrequent
(Kuhnen (2005), Warner and Wu (2006)), suggesting that directors’ interests may be more aligned
with those of management companies than with those of fund investors.
Prior research is not fully conclusive as to whether certain mutual fund governance structures
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are able to mitigate these conflicts of interest and lead to lower fees. Although Tufano and Sevick
(1997) provide evidence for 1992 that funds with smaller boards and funds with boards that have
a higher fraction of independent directors have lower fees, more recent studies (Meschke (2007),
Ferris and Yan (2007)) obtain mixed results. We hypothesize that the boards of better-governed
funds will approve “fair” or “reasonable” fees in fulfillment of their fiduciary duty. This does not
necessarily mean lower fees (although better governance could also result in lower fees), but rather
that fees are more in line with the fund’s performance. Therefore, the relation between fees and
performance should be positive, or at least flatter, for better-governed funds. Similarly, boards of
higher quality may resist more strongly any attempts by management companies and other service
providers to charge higher fees in funds with more performance-inelastic investors. If this were the
case, the relation between fund fees and performance sensitivity would be flatter for better-governed
funds. Although with limitations imposed by the nature of our data, we test these hypotheses using
Morningstar’s board quality grade as a measure of fund governance.
D. Empirical Strategy
To test the empirical validity of the proposed explanations for the negative relation between fees
and before-fee risk-adjusted performance, we investigate how fees vary with fund characteristics,
flow-to-performance sensitivity, and performance. We assume that fund i’s fee at time t, fit, is
a linear function of a vector xit−1 of lagged values of variables that are likely to determine the
fund’s operating costs, the performance-sensitivity of the fund’s flows, Sit, and the fund’s expected
before-fee performance in period t, αit:
fit = γ′xit−1 + λSSit + λααit + νit, (3)
where νit is a generic error term. Because data on most variables are available yearly during most
of the sample period, the time index t in the above equation refers to calendar years.
To test the potential effects of fund governance on fund fees, we also estimate an extended
version of equation (3) that allows both the intercept and the coefficients on performance and
performance sensitivity to depend on board quality.
We build on the literature on mutual fund fee determinants, which mostly considers fund fees
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as a reflection of operating costs, to select the variables that may influence the costs of operating a
fund.10 For every fund-year observation we consider the following variables: size, which we define as
the log of the year-end total net asset value; age, computed as the log of the number of years since
the fund’s organization; size of the complex and number of funds in the complex, which we define
as the sum of fund size over all funds managed by the company that manages the fund, and the
total number of funds managed by that company, respectively; reported annual turnover ; volatility,
computed as the standard deviation of the fund’s monthly returns in the year; and dummy variables
for the fund’s investment objective. We also include a dummy variable to identify single-class load
funds and dummies for the main share classes. Doing so makes it possible for us to correct for the
potential distortions induced by using a homogeneous holding period for all funds, since we can
expect investors with different holding periods to select different share classes. We include time
dummies in all regressions.
We use α̂it, which we define as the sum of estimated monthly alphas in year t, as our proxy for
the fund’s expected before-fee performance.11 Estimated alpha (α̂it) is a good measure of expected
performance (αit) as long as the measurement error in α̂it is not correlated with the level of fees.
If no such correlation exists, the result of including estimated, rather than expected, performance
as a regressor reduces to the well-known attenuation bias in the presence of measurement error.
Thus, the performance coefficient estimates are likely to be biased toward zero.
To obtain a measure of the flow-to-performance sensitivity, Sit, we proceed in two steps. First,
we estimate a model of money flows into mutual funds. Based on prior studies of fund flow
determinants, we allow the sensitivity of flows to past performance to depend on both the level
of performance and fund characteristics. In the second step, we estimate flow-to-performance
sensitivity for each fund and year as the first derivative of conditional expected flow with respect to
the previous year’s performance. The Appendix provides a detailed description of the construction
of this variable.
E. The Determinants of Fund Fees
To investigate the relation between before-fee performance and the total fees paid by investors,
we first use total ownership cost as our dependent variable. We compute total ownership cost as
17
the expense ratio plus total loads divided by seven. Since we consider a seven-year holding period,
to account for usual practices we assume that effective back-end loads are zero for class B and C
shares.
Column (1) in Table IV presents the results of estimating equation (3) without the performance-
sensitivity measure. If the negative relation between expected performance and fees were the
consequence of the omission of variables (for example, size, age, or turnover) that are likely to
determine operating costs and are related to performance, then we would expect the coefficient
on expected performance to change sign, or to at least become statistically insignificant once we
include these variables in the regression. As column (1) shows, this is not the case: the coefficient on
expected performance remains negative and significantly different from zero. Therefore, cost-based
arguments cannot explain why fees and performance are negatively related. Table IV ap-
proximately
here.
Column (2) reports the results of estimating the full model (3), in which we include both
performance and performance-sensitivity as regressors. The negative (and statistically significant at
the 1% level) coefficient on performance sensitivity suggests that equity mutual funds strategically
exploit a low elasticity of demand with respect to net performance to increase their fees. Therefore,
our results extend the findings of Christoffersen and Musto (2002), which were obtained for a cross-
section of money market mutual funds, to the market for actively managed equity mutual funds, for
a much larger sample, and with a more precise measure of performance sensitivity. However, the
inclusion of performance sensitivity does not eliminate the negative association between expected
before-fee risk-adjusted performance and fees. On the contrary, the estimated coefficient in column
(2) is not only negative and statistically significant, but higher (in absolute value) than the estimated
coefficient in column (1). Thus, elasticity of demand appears to be an important determinant of
fees, but does not in itself explain why underperforming funds set higher fees.
To clarify the economic significance of these results, the estimated coefficients in column (2)
imply that a one-standard deviation increase in annual before-fee risk-adjusted performance is
associated with a decrease of 1.38 basis points in annual total ownership cost, while a one-standard
deviation increase in performance sensitivity is associated with a 4.22-basis point decrease in fees
per year. To put these figures in perspective, increases of one-standard deviation in fund volatility
and turnover are associated with increases in total ownership cost of 1.99 and 4.79 basis points,
respectively, while an increase of one standard deviation in fund size is associated with a reduction
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in total ownership cost of 23.21 basis points.
To account for possible nonlinearities, in column (3) we include alpha squared in the regression.
The associated positive coefficient suggests that the relation between alpha and fees becomes flatter
for funds with higher alphas, although it remains negative for plausible values of alpha.
These results indicate that worse-performing funds and those whose investors have a lower
performance sensitivity charge higher fees. Since management companies typically manage many
funds, the results could be due to differences between management companies, differences within
management companies, or a combination of both. Column (4) of Table IV reports the results when
we estimate equation (3) including a management company fixed effect to capture time-invariant
differences between management companies. The estimated coefficients indicate that differences in
fees within management companies are negatively related to differences in alpha or performance
sensitivity. Thus, the results are consistent with management companies strategically setting the
fees of their different funds to match the funds’ expected performance or the performance sensitivity
of their investors.12 The large increase in the adjusted R2 of the regression with respect to the R2
obtained in columns (1) to (3) also suggests that there are management company characteristics
beyond the company’s total size and number of funds that are related to fees. (The joint hypothesis
that all management company fixed effects are zero can be rejected at any reasonable significance
level.) We also generate observations at the level of the management company by taking asset-
weighted averages of all variables, except for complex size and the number of funds in the complex,
for which we retain the management company totals. Column (5) of Table IV reports the results
of estimating equation (3) at the management company level. For each management company we
compute the asset-weighted average of each variable and exclude management companies for which
total net assets of funds with information on the variable are less than 75% of the total net assets
of the management company. We also exclude management companies with more than one-third
of assets under management in index or institutional funds or more than 10% of assets in funds
categorized as outliers. The estimated coefficients for alpha and sensitivity indicate that the results
obtained at the fund level extend to the management company level.
To evaluate whether marketing or nonmarketing fees are responsible for the negative relation
between total fees and performance, we reestimate equation (3), replacing the dependent variable
with marketing and nonmarketing fees, alternatively. We define marketing fees as the sum of front-
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and back-end loads divided by seven (except for B and C share classes, for which we only add
front-end loads) and 12b-1 fees. We define nonmarketing fees as the expense ratio minus 12b-1 fees.
Columns (7) and (8) of Table IV show that both marketing and nonmarketing fees are negatively
related to flow-performance sensitivity and to risk-adjusted performance.13 Therefore, the results
are consistent with the three strategic explanations discussed in Subsection IV.B. In particular, the
results obtained for marketing fees suggest that marketing variables, such as distribution channel
or advertising expenditures, play a significant role in determining mutual fund fees and contribute
to explaining the negative fee-performance relation.
Although our results are consistent with the strategic fee-setting hypotheses, the negative rela-
tion between before-fee performance and fees could also be caused by unobserved fund characteris-
tics that have correlations of opposite signs with fees and before-fee risk-adjusted performance. To
control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity and to shed some light on the determinants of
fee changes, we also estimate the fee equation (3) with fund fixed effects. Column (6) of Table IV
shows that the signs of the coefficients on performance and performance sensitivity remain negative
in the fixed effects specification. Thus, funds appear to alter their fees over time in response to
changes in performance in the same direction found in the absence of fund fixed effects.14 However,
the coefficients on performance and performance sensitivity are smaller in absolute value than those
in column (2) and the latter coefficient is not statistically different from zero at conventional signif-
icance levels. The smaller value and reduced statistical significance of the estimated coefficients on
performance and performance sensitivity in the fund fixed effects specification could be due to fees
being largely a matter of long-term strategy, or to the existence of adjustment costs that create
substantial inertia in fees. The differences between the specifications could also be due to the fact
that our performance and performance sensitivity measures are estimated variables that are likely
to contain substantial measurement error. This measurement error may have a larger impact on
coefficient estimates when we use only time-series variation to estimate them. For example, in the
extreme case in which fund managers’ skills are constant over time, the entire time-series variation
in alphas would be due to estimation error. At the same time, the cross-sectional variation in
estimated performance would allow us to pick up at least part of the effect of the true alpha.
We note that there is a possible alternative explanation for the negative relation between fees
and before-fee performance that we do not explicitly consider in our analysis. Higher fees could be
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paying for better tax management or other fund services, such as check writing, web or telephone
services, or better shareholder statements, that compensate investors for differences in after-fee
performance. Although our data do not enable us to rule out this explanation, there are reasons to
believe that its ability to explain our findings is limited. First, the explanation is valid only if the
value of these services is negatively related to fund performance. Moreover, if better fund services
or more efficient tax management fully compensated investors for lower after-fee performance,
then there would be no reason to expect investors’ money to flow into funds with higher after-
fee performance. The explanation also finds little support from the empirical evidence on both
the perceived and actual value of fund services, which seem to be limited (Capon, Fitzimmons,
and Prince (1996), Elton, Gruber, and Busse (2004), Bergstresser, Chalmers, and Tufano (2007),
Christoffersen, Evans, and Musto (2005)). The fact that we find a negative relation between fees
and performance when we include fund fixed effects also casts doubt on the plausibility of this
interpretation, unless the level of services changes over time in a direction opposite to performance.
F. Fund Governance and Fees
To analyze the role played by fund governance in the determination of fees, we create dummy
variables corresponding to each one of the Morningstar board quality grades. Since only one fund
in our sample received Morningstar’s lowest board quality rating, we create a single dummy for the
Very Poor and Poor categories, which we refer to as “Poor.” We also create interaction variables of
board-quality dummies with before-fee risk-adjusted performance and with our flow-to-performance
sensitivity measure.
In Table V we present our regression results. Because of the limitations of our governance
subsample, discussed in Section I, these results should be interpreted with caution. First, the
fact that our governance information corresponds to the end of the sample period makes a causal
interpretation of the governance coefficients problematic and implies that the results may be subject
to survivorship bias. Further, the governance subsample is not a random sample of the population.
As we describe in Section I, funds in the governance subsample tend to have lower-than-average
fees and higher-than-average performance. Keeping these caveats in mind, the results in columns
(1) to (5) of Table V provide some support for the hypothesis that better board quality leads to fees
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that better reflect the value generated by mutual funds, and that better board quality also limits
the ability of management companies to extract rents from performance-insensitive investors. Table V ap-
proximately
here.
Column (1) presents the results of estimating the fee equation when we exclude the performance
and performance sensitivity terms, but allow the intercept to depend on the board quality grade.
In the table, we omit the dummy variable for the Poor grade, so coefficients associated with Fair,
Good, or Excellent grades represent differences with respect to funds with a Poor grade. Funds
with Good and Excellent grades are associated with lower total ownership costs than Poor and Fair
funds, although the difference between the coefficients associated with Excellent and Poor grades
is not statistically different from zero. Column (2), which reports the results of estimating the
full model, also implies that for most values of before-fee alpha or performance sensitivity in the
sample, funds with Good or Excellent grades are predicted to be cheaper, all other things equal,
than funds with Poor or Fair grades (although this conclusion cannot be directly inferred from the
table since the difference between the fees of two funds identical in every respect except for their
board quality grade is not just captured by the intercept, but depends on the levels of alpha and
performance sensitivity). Thus, columns (1) and (2) suggest that better board quality is associated
with lower total ownership costs. However, although in no case are the total ownership costs of a
fund with a higher board quality grade significantly higher than those of a fund with a lower grade,
some of the estimated differences are not statistically significant and the levels of the estimated
coefficients are not strictly monotonic in board quality.
If better board quality brings fees more in line with performance, then the coefficients on
before-fee performance and performance sensitivity should be negative for poorly governed funds
and the interaction coefficients should be positive and increasing in board quality. The estimated
coefficients on performance in column (2) are consistent with this hypothesis. The coefficients
on performance sensitivity point in the same direction, but in this case none of the differences is
statistically significant at conventional significance levels.
Since, as mentioned above, funds managed by the same management company frequently share
the same board, we also reestimate the fee regression at the management company level by taking
asset-weighted averages of the variables. Column (3) in Table V reports that the signs of the
coefficients of interest are the same as in the previous column, although no coefficient (other than
the intercept for funds with an Excellent grade) is significantly different from zero (a result that is
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not due to a reduced magnitude of the coefficients but to much larger standard errors).
Tufano and Sevick (1997) argue that the effect of fund governance should be most visible for
management fees, since for these fees we can expect the conflict of interest between the management
company and shareholders to be most severe. However, these authors find little difference in how
board characteristics are related to marketing and nonmarketing fees. We replicate the analysis
carried out in columns (1) and (2) with marketing and nonmarketing fees as dependent variables,
although we report only the estimated coefficients of the full model in columns (4) and (5) of
Table V, respectively. The results for marketing fees are mixed. Funds with Good and Excellent
grades charge lower fees (although in column (4) the intercept for funds with an Excellent grade is
marginally higher than that for funds with a Poor grade, the former are cheaper on average, other
things equal) and have the highest coefficients on before-fee performance. However, the funds with
a Fair grade—not those with a Poor grade—are the ones that charge the highest fees and have the
lowest coefficient on before-fee performance. Therefore, there is no monotonicity at the bottom in
the relation between board quality and marketing fees. Further, the differences between funds with
a Poor grade and funds with a Good or Excellent grade are not statistically significant. Finally,
the sensitivity coefficients follow no clear pattern: the lowest (and negative) coefficient corresponds
to funds with the highest board quality grade.
The results for nonmarketing fees are more in line with those in columns (1) and (2). When we
estimate the same specification as in column (1) (see the Internet Appendix for the results), we find
that other things equal, funds with a Poor grade charge the highest nonmarketing fees, and funds
with Good and Excellent grades charge the lowest nonmarketing fees (which is the same ordering
as the one implied by the intercepts in column (5)). The relation between performance sensitiv-
ity and nonmarketing fees becomes flatter as board quality improves: the sensitivity coefficient is
−14.91 for funds with a Poor grade and the estimated differences imply that the same coefficient
for funds with an Excellent grade is 2.23. However, further tests indicate that this coefficient is
not significantly different from zero. Finally, funds with a Poor grade have a negative coefficient
on performance. This coefficient is significantly lower than the coefficients for all other grades,
although the coefficients for the higher grades are not increasing in board quality. Therefore, the
results are consistent with the hypothesis that better-governed funds resist attempts by manage-
ment companies to exploit investors’ low performance sensitivity. The results also provide weaker
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evidence for the hypothesis that better board quality brings nonmarketing fees more in line with
fund performance.
Since CRSP started providing data on management fees as of 2003, we can perform the analysis
with management fees as the dependent variable for the 2003 to 2005 period. When we estimate
a specification such as the one in column (1), we again find that the worst-governed funds charge
the highest fees, as suggested by the ordering of the intercept coefficients reported in column
(6). Further, the differences between the sensitivity coefficients are similar to those in column (5),
although the statistical significance of the coefficients is marginal at best. However, the performance
coefficients follow no clear pattern: the coefficient for the best-governed funds is not only negative
but lower than all other coefficients, a result that is in stark contrast with those in columns (1)
to (5). To check whether this result is due to a different behavior of management fees or to the
different sample period, we reestimate the equation with nonmarketing fees, which are the closest
approximation to actual management fees, as the dependent variable for the 2003 to 2005 period,
and report the results in column (7) of Table V. Although the size and statistical significance of
the performance coefficients vary, the ordering of these coefficients is the same in columns (6) and
(7), showing that the best-governed funds have the lowest performance coefficient in both columns.
We cannot explain this result. It may be due to an effort by the best-performing among the best-
governed funds to lower their fees to compensate mutual fund investors for the decline in the stock
markets during the 2000 to 2002 period, or to a response by these funds to the series of mutual fund
scandals that emerged in 2003 and 2004. However, the short sample period, the noise inherent in
our performance measure, and the fact that the only significant differences between the full sample
and the 2003 to 2005 period have to do with the coefficients on performance suggest caution when
interpreting the differences as indicating a structural change.
V. Conclusion
In this paper we show that there is a negative relation between funds’ before-fee performance
and the fees they charge to investors. Since this evidence is at odds with economic intuition, we
subject it to a series of robustness tests, and find that it survives all of them.
Next, we propose two explanations for this anomalous result. According to the first explanation,
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the negative relation is the consequence of factors, which are omitted in univariate regressions, that
are both positively correlated with returns and negatively correlated with funds’ operating costs,
and thus also with fund fees. According to the second explanation, in contrast, the negative
relation is the result of funds that strategically set fees as a function of their past or expected
performance. We consider three related rationales for this strategic behavior. The first, proposed
by Christoffersen and Musto (2002), argues that funds with worse past performance have a pool
of investors that are less sensitive to fund performance. Faced with an inelastic demand for their
shares, underperforming funds optimally increase fees. The second explanation, proposed by Gil-
Bazo and Ruiz-Verdu´ (2008), argues that funds with lower expected performance optimally set
higher fees and target performance-insensitive investors, since these funds anticipate that they will
not be able to compete with better-performing funds in the market for sophisticated investors.
On the other hand, better-performing funds keep fees low because of competition among them
for the money of performance-sensitive investors. The third explanation argues that funds with
different expected performance choose different marketing strategies. Funds with low expected
performance are marketed to performance-insensitive investors and have higher distribution costs,
which translate into higher fees.
The empirical analysis finds support for all strategic-pricing explanations. Even though funds’
operating costs are important determinants of fees, they do not explain away the negative relation
between before-fee performance and fees. When we control for those cost determinants, we find
that funds with lower expected before-fee performance and funds with less elastic demands charge
higher marketing and nonmarketing fees. Therefore, it appears that mutual fund competition
and regulation have not been sufficient to ensure that fees reflect the value that funds create for
investors. However, we find some evidence that better fund governance may be associated with fees
that are more in line with performance: among the best-governed funds, worse performance need
not mean higher fees.
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Appendix. Estimation of Flow-to-Performance Sensitivity
We define annual net flow to fund i in year t, Flowit, as the relative growth of the fund’s total
net assets (TNA) adjusted for returns net of expenses, Rnit:
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Flowit =
TNAit − TNAit−1(1 +Rnit)
TNAit−1
. (A1)
Our model for fund flow determination builds on the main stylized facts that have emerged
from prior studies on fund flows.16 These studies show that flows of money to mutual funds are
positively related to recent relative after-expense performance. In turn, the sensitivity of flows to
performance has been shown to be higher for recent top performers, implying a convex flow-to-
performance function, and lower for older funds. Further, the flow-performance curve becomes less
convex as investor participation costs decrease (Huang, Wei, and Yan (2007)). Finally, research
shows that flows depend on fund size, age, and expenses, total complex size, lagged flows, and total
flows into funds with the same investment objective.
In addition to the variables considered in previous studies, we include the proxy for performance
sensitivity proposed by Christoffersen and Musto (2002). These authors posit that funds that have
experienced the largest outflows are left with the least performance-sensitive investors. Thus, these
authors propose the following measure of fund attrition as a proxy for performance sensitivity:
Q/MAXit =
TNAit
MAXit
, (A2)
where TNAit is fund i’s total net asset value at the beginning of period t and MAXit is the
maximum total net asset value of fund i in the time-span up to period t.
We propose the following model for fund flow determination:
Flowit = a0t + b0Perfit−1 + b1Perfit−1rel ageit−1 + b2Perfit−1rel Q/MAXit−1
+aMIM,it−1 + bMPerfit−1IM,it−1 + aPCM IM,it−1PCit−1 + b
PC
M Perfit−1IM,it−1PCit−1
+aHIH,it−1 + bHPerfit−1IH,it−1 + aPCH IH,it−1PCit−1 + b
PC
H Perfit−1IH,it−1PCit−1
+c′wit−1 + ϕit, (A3)
26
where ϕit is a generic error term. The proxy for past performance, Perfit−1, is the fund’s four-factor
alpha in year t − 1, net of expenses, and in excess of the mean performance of all funds with the
same investment objective in that year. The term IM,it (IH,it) is a dummy variable that equals
one if Perfit is among the middle (top) third of all funds with the same investment objective in
year t. We include these variables to allow for a convex relation between performance and flows.
The variables rel ageit and rel Q/MAXit are, respectively, the log of the fund’s age in years and
the fund’s Q/MAX, in excess of the category’s average in year t. The variable PC is a proxy for
participation costs. We consider two of the proxies proposed by Huang, Wei, and Yan (2007): total
assets managed by the company (in excess of the category’s average in that year); and a dummy
variable that equals one if there is another fund managed by the same management company with
performance in the top 5% of its category, that is, a “star” fund. The vector of lagged control
variables, wit−1, comprises: fund size and age; front- and back-end loads; 12b-1 fee; nonmarketing
expenses; dummy variables for share classes; return volatility; total net asset value for all funds
under the same management company; the fund’s net flow; total flows of money to all funds with
the same investment objective; and Q/MAX. Regressions also include year dummies.
The estimation results for equation (A3), which are available in the Internet Appendix on the
Journal of Finance website, are consistent with results from previous studies: flows are positively
related to past (relative) performance; the flow-performance relation is convex; flow-to-performance
sensitivity decreases with fund age; and convexity increases with participation costs. Consistent
with Christoffersen and Musto’s (2002) conjecture, Q/MAX is positively associated with flow-to-
performance sensitivity.
Finally, we compute our measure of flow-to-performance sensitivity as the first derivative of
conditional expected flow for performance, given the estimated coefficients from (A3):
Sit =
∂Et−1(Flowit)
∂Perfit−1
= bˆ0 + bˆ1rel ageit−1 + bˆ2rel Q/MAXit−1 +
+bˆMIM,it−1 + bˆPCM IM,it−1PCit−1 + bˆHIH,it−1 + bˆ
PC
H IH,it−1PCit−1, (A4)
where Et−1(·) denotes the expectation operator conditional on the information set at time t − 1.
Although we compute two measures of flow-to-performance sensitivity, each corresponding to a
different proxy for participation costs, given the similarity of results, we report only those corre-
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sponding to complex size as a proxy for participation costs.
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Notes
1See, e.g., Brown and Goetzmann (1995); Gruber (1996); Carhart (1997); Daniel et al. (1997);
Wermers (2000); Cohen, Coval, and Pastor (2005); Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005); or
Kosowski et al. (2006).
2Some funds allow the percentage to depend on fund performance. Although our data do not
allow us to identify these funds, the evidence reported in Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2003), Kuhnen
(2005), and Warner and Wu (2006) suggests that for most of our sample period the fraction of
funds with incentive fees is very small.
3Funds often waive at least a fraction of the loads. Therefore, the loads typically reported in
databases, such as the one we use in this paper, can often overestimate effective loads.
4URL: http://www.afajof.org.
5Morningstar’s Stewardship Grade includes other components. See Wellman and Zhou (2008)
for a recent analysis of the Morningstar Stewardship Grade.
6Since fund returns are reported after expenses, to retrieve monthly before-expense returns, we
add annual expenses divided by 12 to reported returns. This measure is only an approximation
since we ignore the compounding effect of the accrual of expenses over the year, and because the
actual accrual of expenses may not be completely smooth (Tufano, Quinn, and Taliaferro (2006)).
7Data are downloaded from Kenneth French’s website, http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages
/faculty/ken.french/.
8We follow Fama and MacBeth (1973) in our choice of a five-year estimation period, instead
of the three-year period used by Carhart (1997). Although a longer estimation period excludes a
greater fraction of funds from the sample, it also reduces sampling error in betas and mitigates
the effect of two forms of selection bias that affect mostly the subset of young funds in the CRSP
database: omission bias and incubation bias (Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2001) and Evans (2007)).
9We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this possibility.
10Different aspects of mutual fund fee determination have been studied, among others, by
Ferris and Chance (1987), Tufano and Sevick (1997), Latzko (1999), Malhotra and McLeod (1997),
Chalmers, Edelen, and Kadlec (2001), Luo (2002), Deli (2002), and Golec (2003).
11In the remainder of the paper, we focus on unconditional Carhart’s alpha exclusively. We
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use α̂it as a measure of the alpha expected by the manager of fund i at the beginning of period t
under the assumption that fees are set at the beginning of period t. If fees were set in the middle
of period t, our measure of expected performance would thus aggregate performance observed prior
to setting fees with expected performance. We have estimated the fee equation using α̂it+1 as a
measure of expected returns and obtained identical results.
12Our estimates with management company fixed effects might also pick up longitudinal vari-
ation at the management company level. To isolate the cross-sectional variation, we also estimate
yearly cross-sectional regressions with management company fixed effects and obtain coefficient
estimates and standard errors (see the Internet Appendix) for the whole sample period, using the
Fama-MacBeth procedure. The resulting coefficients for alpha and performance sensitivity are neg-
ative, statistically significant, and only slightly smaller (in absolute value) than the corresponding
coefficients obtained without management company fixed effects.
13Given the large incidence of funds with zero marketing fees, we also estimate a Tobit model
and obtain very similar coefficients and standard errors (results available in the Internet Appendix).
14In tests available in the Internet Appendix, we also estimate the fee equation in differences,
as well as logit and probit regressions for the probability of fee changes, and obtain similar results.
15Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2001) report a number of errors associated with mutual fund
mergers and splits in the CRSP sample. Huang, Wei, and Yan (2007) argue that these errors could
lead to extreme values of flows. We deal with this problem by eliminating the 1% of observations
with the lowest and highest flows in each year.
16Studies on mutual fund flow determinants include Ippolito (1992), Gruber (1996), Chevalier
and Ellison (1997), Sirri and Tufano (1998), Jain and Wu (2001), Barber, Odean, and Zheng (2005),
Nanda, Wang, and Zheng (2005), and Huang, Wei, and Yan (2007).
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Table I
Summary Statistics: Board Quality Measure
The table shows the distribution of the board quality grade provided by Morningstar for funds in the
governance subsample in year 2005. The first row reports the frequency of each grade; the second row
reports the relative frequency (in percentage terms); and the third row reports the cumulative frequency (in
percentage terms).
Very Poor Poor Fair Good Excellent Total
Frequency 1 69 374 486 176 1,106
% 0.09 6.24 33.82 43.94 15.91 100
Cumulative 0.09 6.33 40.14 84.09 100
Table II
Before-Fee Risk-Adjusted Performance and Expense Ratios
The table shows estimated slope coefficients for the OLS regression of funds’ monthly before-fee risk-adjusted
performance on monthly expense ratios in the period from January 1962 to December 2005. Betas are
estimated using Carhart’s four-factor model (rows 1-3) or Fama-French’s three-factor model (row 4) with a
five-year estimation period. Risk-adjusted performance in month t is estimated as the difference between
the fund’s monthly before-expense return in month t and the product of betas and the factor realizations
for that month. All regressions include dummies for months. Standard errors are reported in parentheses
and adjusted R2 statistics in %. One, two, and three asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Superscripts a, b, and c denote that the null hypothesis of a unit coefficient
is rejected at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. The number of observations is 232,386.
Risk-adjusted
Performance
Standard
Errors Coefficient Adj. R
2
Carhart White -0.6284∗∗∗,c 10.07
(0.1055)
Carhart Clustered by Time -0.6284∗∗,c 10.07
(0.2529)
Carhart Fama-MacBeth -1.4077∗∗∗,c 0.05
(0.3352)
Fama-French Clustered by Time -0.2076c 9.43
(0.2599)
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Table III
Regressions by Subsamples
The table shows estimated slope coefficients for the OLS regression of funds’ monthly before-fee risk-adjusted
performance on monthly fees in the period from January 1962 to December 2005 for Panels A through C,
and the period from January 1992 to December 2005 for Panel D. Betas are estimated using Carhart’s
four-factor model with a five-year estimation period. Risk-adjusted performance in month t is the difference
between the fund’s monthly before-expense return and the product of betas and the factor realizations in
t. Monthly fees are defined as the annual expense ratio divided by 12, except for Panel B, where monthly
fees are annual expense ratios divided by 12 plus the sum of front-end and back-end loads divided by the
assumed holding period in months. In Panel A the sample does not include for each month the decile of
fund-month observations with the lowest total net assets among all actively managed retail funds. In Panel
B No-Load Funds are defined as those charging no front- or back-end loads. All regressions include dummies
for months. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by time. Adjusted R2 statistics are reported in
%. One, two, and three asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Superscripts a, b, and c denote that the null hypothesis of a unit coefficient is rejected at the 10%, 5%, and
1% significance levels, respectively.
Subsample Coefficient Adj. R2 Obs.
Panel A. Effect of small funds
Deciles 2-10 -0.4602∗,c 10.28 225,450
(0.2693)
Panel B. Other fees
No-load funds -0.9099∗∗∗,c 8.51 81,323
(0.3220)
Load Funds (2-year holding period) -0.2660∗∗∗,c 11.22 150,148
(0.1003)
Load Funds (7-year holding period) -0.5186∗,c 11.22 150,148
(0.2823)
Panel C. Regressions by subperiods
1967-1976 -0.9938b 14.26 16,504
(0.9190)
1977-1986 -0.9581∗,c 8.81 26,591
(0.5625)
1987-1996 -0.8129∗∗∗,c 5.65 39,567
(0.2560)
1997-2005 -0.5384c 10.43 149,724
(0.3347)
Panel D. Regressions by investment objective
Aggressive Growth Funds -0.4304a 17.44 13,419
(0.7244)
Growth MidCap Funds -0.0183a 27.99 15,366
(0.6181)
Growth and Income Funds -0.5840∗∗∗,c 12.79 39,221
(0.1619)
Growth Funds -0.6557∗∗,c 8.48 70,277
(0.2757)
Small Company Growth Funds -0.6931∗,c 21.88 35,065
(0.3974)
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Table IV
Mutual Fund Fee Determinants
The table reports estimated coefficients for yearly regressions of funds’ fees on selected fund characteristics
in the 1993 to 2005 period. The dependent variable in columns (1) to (6) is total annual ownership cost
(TOC ), computed as total loads divided by seven plus the annual expense ratio. In columns (7) and (8), the
dependent variable is marketing fees (Mark.), defined as total loads divided by seven plus 12b-1 fees, and
nonmarketing fees (N-Mark.), computed as expense ratios minus 12b-1 fees, respectively. Back-end loads
are assumed to be zero for share classes B and C. The coefficients in columns (1) to (3) and (7) to (8)
are estimated by pooled OLS. Column (4) reports estimated coefficients for a regression with management
company fixed effects. In column (5) all variables are asset-weighted averages at the management company
level. Column (6) reports estimated coefficients for a regression with fund fixed effects. The size of the
management company and the number of funds in the management company are denoted by Co. Size and
# funds, respectively. σt−1 is the standard deviation of the fund’s monthly returns in year t. St denotes
the slope of the estimated flow-to-performance relation. α̂t is the year t four-factor alpha. All regressions
include year dummies and dummy variables for the different investment objectives and share classes. All
fees are expressed in bp. The table also reports robust standard errors (in parentheses), which are clustered
by fund in columns (1) to (3) and (6) to (8), and by management company in columns (4) to (5). The total
number of observations and the adjusted R2 of the regression (in %) are reported at the bottom of the table.
One, two, and three asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
TOC Mark. N-Mark.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sizet−1 -9.38∗∗∗ -9.77∗∗∗ -9.76∗∗∗ -7.04∗∗∗ -7.25∗∗∗ -6.35∗∗∗ -3.40∗∗∗
(0.70) (0.82) (0.82) (1.02) (0.80) (0.60) (0.54)
Aget−1 -4.96∗∗∗ -8.65∗∗∗ -8.63∗∗∗ -12.05∗∗∗ -0.18 -9.91∗∗∗ -2.99∗∗∗ -5.61∗∗∗
(1.55) (1.73) (1.73) (1.69) (0.19) (0.00) (1.10) (1.29)
Co. Sizet−1 -1.06 -1.17 -1.14 -3.75∗∗ -12.82∗∗∗ -1.39∗ 7.46∗∗∗ -8.64∗∗∗
(0.73) (0.81) (0.80) (1.75) (1.58) (0.84) (0.64) (0.55)
# fundst−1 -0.09 -0.14 -0.14 0.16 1.44∗∗∗ -0.05 -0.66∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.19) (0.53) (0.10) (0.09) (0.06)
Turnovert−1 3.29∗∗∗ 3.27∗∗∗ 3.19∗∗∗ 0.14 9.84∗∗∗ 1.93∗∗∗ -0.70 3.92∗∗∗
(0.73) (0.86) (0.86) (1.04) (2.34) (0.82) (0.70) (0.60)
σt−1 42.53∗∗∗ 34.70∗∗∗ 28.18∗∗ 13.09∗ 58.53∗∗ -12.22∗∗∗ 17.89∗∗ 16.33∗∗
(10.45) (11.49) (11.34) (7.62) (27.78) (6.01) (8.73) (7.92)
α̂t -14.65
∗∗∗ -18.56∗∗∗ -19.48∗∗∗ -11.74∗∗ -39.16∗∗ -5.10∗ -11.79∗∗∗ -6.94∗
(5.33) (5.64) (5.68) (5.00) (17.77) (2.92) (4.41) (3.67)
α̂2t 75.84
∗∗∗
(27.38)
St -7.06
∗∗∗ -7.01∗∗∗ -3.81∗∗∗ -6.54∗∗∗ -0.70 -1.18∗ -5.87∗∗∗
(1.11) (1.11) (0.96) (2.10) (0.55) (0.70) (0.82)
Obs. 12,709 10,290 10,290 10,290 1,580 10,290 10,284 10,353
Adj. R2 52.11 55.19 55.23 74.67 54.83 94.22 59.17 42.69
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Table V
Fund Governance and Fees
The table reports estimated coefficients for the pooled OLS regression of funds’ fees on selected fund charac-
teristics in the 1993 to 2005 period, except for columns (6) to (7), where the sample period is 2003 through
2005. In columns (1) and (2) the dependent variable is fund total annual ownership cost (TOC ), computed
as total loads divided by seven plus the annual expense ratio. In column (3) the dependent variable is
the asset-weighted average at the management company level of total annual ownership costs. All regres-
sors in column (3) are also asset-weighted averages at the management company level of the corresponding
fund-level variables, except for the size of the management company (Co. Size) and the number of funds
in the management company (# funds), which are management company totals. In column (4) the depen-
dent variable is marketing fees (Mark.), defined as total loads divided by seven plus 12b-1 fees. Back-end
loads are assumed to be zero for share classes B and C. In columns (5) and (7) the dependent variable is
nonmarketing fees (N-Mark.), computed as expense ratios minus 12b-1 fees. Column (6) shows results for
management fees (Mgmt.). σt−1 is the standard deviation of the fund’s monthly returns in year t. α̂t is year
t’s four-factor alpha. St denotes the slope of the estimated flow-to-performance relation. Fair, Good, and
Excell. are dummy variables that take a value of one if the observation has Fair, Good, or Excellent board
quality grade, respectively, and zero otherwise. All regressions include year dummies and dummy variables
for the different investment objectives and share classes. All fees are expressed in bp. The table also reports
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by fund in all columns except column
(3), in which they are clustered by management company. The total number of observations and the adjusted
R2 of the regression (in %) are reported at the bottom of each column. One, two, and three asterisks indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
39
TOC TOC TOC Mark. N-Mark. Mgmt. N-Mark.
(2003-2005) (2003-2005)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sizet−1 -6.87*** -7.93*** -6.14*** -1.83*** -0.46 -1.85***
(0.61) (0.98) (0.97) (0.55) (0.44) (0.53)
Aget−1 -2.98*** -10.50*** -0.53** -1.43 -9.07*** -6.01*** -7.21***
(1.01) (1.69) (0.26) (1.64) (1.21) (1.19) (1.41)
Co. Sizet−1 -1.16 0.53 -3.25* 7.87*** -7.33*** -4.40*** -8.37***
(0.77) (1.05) (1.72) (0.95) (0.63) (0.72) (0.82)
# fundst−1 -0.16* -0.37*** -0.20 -0.71*** 0.34*** -0.02 0.44***
(0.09) (0.12) (0.33) (0.12) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
Turnovert−1 -0.58 -2.64* -2.05 -5.21*** 2.58** 1.09 1.29
(1.12) (1.48) (4.19) (1.52) (1.06) (1.03) (1.25)
σt−1 -5.51 3.82 41.91 -5.52 9.25 29.99* 38.60**
(10.95) (16.12) (35.98) (15.77) (10.46) (17.11) (17.45)
Fair 4.77 5.03 -2.33 19.75*** -14.69*** -12.98*** -17.06***
(4.50) (5.81) (21.28) (4.52) (4.39) (3.06) (4.38)
Good -9.83** -17.12*** -19.03 -1.94 -15.05*** -9.40*** -19.06***
(4.40) (5.93) (19.17) (4.73) (4.19) (3.17) (4.22)
Excell. -7.95 -13.74* -38.63* 5.72 -19.33*** -10.69*** -19.52***
(5.11) (7.09) (21.36) (5.88) (4.88) (3.76) (5.00)
αˆt -50.70** -104.83 -2.06 -48.57*** 9.12 -17.50
(22.70) (116.06) (15.41) (15.08) (24.14) (40.89)
αˆtFair 28.15 35.53 -42.82** 71.05*** -3.01 67.03
(24.52) (116.67) (18.42) (16.81) (27.19) (44.59)
αˆtGood 57.35** 157.18 1.90 54.74*** 2.62 61.96
(24.27) (114.03) (17.24) (15.72) (28.92) (43.64)
αˆtExcell. 61.63** 106.99 19.90 41.32** -72.74** -41.67
(26.42) (112.55) (18.60) (17.54) (35.48) (51.16)
St -8.59 -7.71 6.01* -14.91*** -6.08 -17.22***
(5.37) (18.35) (3.52) (4.08) (3.98) (4.37)
StFair 3.60 -12.43 -9.15** 12.99*** 6.14 17.52***
(5.94) (19.30) (4.37) (4.36) (4.19) (4.69)
StGood 7.31 6.28 -3.09 10.56** 4.11 12.90***
(5.70) (18.05) (4.00) (4.23) (4.33) (4.58)
StExcell. 4.97 15.06 -12.21** 17.14*** 10.31* 16.08***
(6.50) (19.28) (4.81) (4.93) (5.43) (5.74)
Obs. 7,767 3,933 545 3,933 3,971 1,734 1,734
Adj. R2 58.58 67.39 68.64 65.73 46.59 39.51 39.40
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Figure 1. Nonparametric Regressions. The figure shows mutual fund conditional expected risk-adjusted
performance as a nonparametric function of expense ratios (solid thick line). Risk-adjusted performance in
month t is estimated as the difference between the fund’s monthly return in month t and the product of betas
and the factor realizations for that month using Carhart’s four-factor model. Both monthly risk-adjusted
performance and expense ratios are annualized. The conditional expectation has been estimated using the
Nadaraya-Watson estimator with a Gaussian kernel. Dotted lines show upper and lower bounds of the
95% pointwise confidence interval. The figure also plots conditional expected alphas as a linear function of
expenses as implied by the estimated OLS coefficient of the linear regression (solid thin line). Dashed vertical
lines correspond to the 1st and 99th percentiles of the expense ratio sample distribution. The bottom panel
displays the results obtained when we de-mean expenses and risk-adjusted performance by subtracting the
month’s sample average.
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